



**PROJECT AGINCOURT
DRPM-UxS**
3030 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3030

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SUBJECT: Building the Autonomous Warfare Command

In 1928, Secretary of War Dwight Davis ordered the Army to experiment with a unified mechanized force: tanks, armored trucks, and motorized infantry fighting as one. It was soon disbanded. Mechanization was broken up to support existing branches as add-ons. It took the German blitzkrieg of 1940 to force the creation of the U.S. Armored Force.

We face an equally urgent revolution. Low-cost drones have changed the character, speed and economics of war. Rather than repeat 1928, Secretary Hegseth chose the maximal path. He established Project Agincourt to change how we fight.

Agincourt has two missions. First, stand up a four-star Autonomous Warfare Command (AUTOWARCOM) by October 1, 2027, with the authority its commander needs to drive the largest institutional change since the interwar years. Second, continue the mission of the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems (DRPM-UxS) while pioneering a new acquisition model that pairs autonomous and robotics companies directly with operational forces at the edge. The goal is not a particular drone. It is a system built to adapt at scale.

This is not change at the margin. Since the Cold War, American power projection has rested on a small number of sophisticated, expensive weapons. That model has been disrupted. The U.S. can build a new generational advantage by adapting at the edge faster than adversaries by leveraging two strengths: our lead in superintelligence, and an unmatched NCO corps.

Urgency does not excuse imprecision. We will work analytically with the Joint Staff, the Services and, above all, the operational units that will serve as our incubators. Evidence will decide outcomes. Competitions, exercises and combat performance will determine which systems scale and which are cut. The power of the purse demands strict stewardship. To flip the cost exchange, every auditable dollar we spend should reduce cost-per-kill or risk-to-force.

We have set a hard test for ourselves. These new systems will not be declared ready on paper. Combatant commanders must be able to wield them in combat. The new model must strengthen the Services while empowering each theater build its own mix. The ideal Pacific portfolio is not right for Europe. This work will demand professional courage. We must challenge the obsolete processes, platforms and spending habits that have built up over decades. As Chairman Caine asks, "If not us, who? If not now, when?"

We are on the clock. In service of AUTOWARCOM, Agincourt must quickly remove the barriers that constrain the initiative of our service members by fusing operations and development. We will not replace one bureaucracy with another. One measure of success will be the time it takes for an operational problem to receive a fielded solution evaluated for scale. If we get this right, we will do more than establish a new command. AUTOWARCOM will institutionalize a mission-based system whose main product is adaptation, building a next-generation development model for sustained American military advantage.

Over WSD
CEO

MSH
CEO