On nuclear arms control and the trust nobody talks about

Something unusual happens when Russian and American nuclear commanders think about each other. Not hatred. Not fear, exactly. Something closer to professional respect, the kind chess players develop across the board.

Each side spent decades studying the other. Both know, with considerable precision, what the other can do. More importantly, both know what the other cannot prevent. Retaliation will happen.

This shared understanding explains why, on February 5, 2026, nothing in particular happened.

There were no changes in alert levels, no sudden movements of forces, no emergency statements meant to signal resolve or alarm. Somewhere inside two large bureaucracies, a date passed, a document expired, and officials took note before moving on to the next item on their calendars.

For an agreement long described as a pillar of global nuclear stability, the end of New START arrived with surprising calm.

That calm reflects something more durable than treaties. A shared assessment, across institutions and borders, that the basic structure of deterrence remains intact. The foundation was never legal language. It was mutual recognition that neither side can win, neither can fully defend, and both face catastrophic loss if deterrence fails.

That recognition doesn’t need restating on paper. It only needs to remain true.

Read more here.