All over the eastern front, Ukrainian troops are in retreat. As the Ukrainian Military struggles to reconsolidate and hold their lines, soldiers and their commanders are growing concerned over ineffective command and control, lack of logistic support, and staggering casualty rates. 

“We don’t know what the units around us are doing. The LOC (line of contact) is quite fluid, when we detect gaps in the Russian lines and we request permission to move forward and fill the gaps, we don’t get quick answers from our command. When our lines come under heavy artillery attack, sometimes the best thing is to fall back to a stronger position, but it takes too long to get an answer, so we stay where we are and take casualties. We never have enough artillery support while the Russians seem to never run out. We get told to go to a location and set up a position, but no one tells us why we are going there or how long we will stay.” 

The comments above came from two mid-level Ukrainian soldiers while they were training in Poland in 2024. Both soldiers had been fighting since 2020. Their “guys on-the-ground” comments partly explain why the Ukrainian Military's line of contact collapsed in Kursk in March 2025, when Russian forces launched the "Pipe Operation." Ukraine’s counter-offensive in Kursk will likely go down as one of the biggest strategic mistakes of the war. Ukraine’s losses after 7 months of fighting in Kursk are stunning: over 69,120 soldiers killed; 400 tanks and 620 infantry fighting vehicles destroyed; 2,503 motor vehicles; 568 artillery guns; 59 MLRS launchers and 13 of HIMARS destroyed. For context, the US lost 58,000 men in Viet Nam from 1963-1973.

One of the Ukrainian soldiers who was captured by the Russians in Kursk explained it this way: “When the Russians appeared out of nowhere everyone panicked. Our commanders stopped answering the radio. This meant that I did not know where to go or how to retreat. We simply did not know what to do. We had no instructions on this matter. We sat in the field for three days, three days. Then we decided to go out. My comrade was wounded so we hid in a cellar until we were captured by Russian special forces.”

I contacted two former members of the US military who were involved in training the Ukraine Army as far back as 2018, and both told me that none of these comments surprised them. “The process of creating, organizing, and supplying the Ukraine Military has been faulted from the beginning,” they told me. 

When I asked the two US trainers if they ever called out the problems the Ukraine military was having with command, control, and communication, here’s what they told me:

Trainer #1: Most of the Ukranians I trained in the early years (2018-2022) were good soldiers. However, they were overwhelmingly skeptical of the “NATO way” of fighting. Whenever we gave feedback to our bosses that the Ukrainians weren’t taking the training well or that they seemed to want to fight their own way, we were told to ignore them and to stick to the POI (Program of Instruction).

Trainer #2: When we first started training the Ukrainians they wanted to do all the high-speed stuff, but we told them the most important skills they needed to learn were light Infantry fire and maneuver. It takes time and repetition to become a competent light Infantryman, but Ukrainian commanders only cared about checking the box for NATO standards. When I suggested to a senior Ukrainian Officer that they should allow their soldiers and officers to spend more time learning to shoot, maneuver, and communicate, he told me, ‘This isn’t Afghanistan, you Americans don’t understand how to fight against the Russians.’ We heard that often and it was frustrating because we knew it was going to cause big problems for them on the battlefield.” 

The trainers weren’t the only ones who understood there was a problem. One of the most experienced NATO advisors memorialized the issues in a detailed report that he submitted in July 2021. Retied British LTC Glen Grant wrote a report titled: Seven Years of Deadlock: Why Ukraine’s Military Reforms Have Gone Nowhere, and How the US Should Respond. The author understood the newly created Ukrainian military better than most because he was the first military advisor to Ukraine in 2014, and one of only a handful of individuals who were continuously part of the advisory group from 2014 to 2022.  

While you can read the full report here, there are a few foundational points worth highlighting: 

-It is remarkable and stretching credibility that after seven years of war (2014-2012), neither the Ukrainian military nor the defense industry has undergone any substantial or lasting reforms. 

-Ukraine has made virtually no more changes than would have occurred naturally by evolution over time or in reaction to Russian attacks. Moreover, even those incremental developments have totally and utterly failed to create a sensible military answer. This sounds inexplicable, but it is completely true.

-Only about 50,000 soldiers could have deployed when the war started in February 2014; but of those, only about 6,000 were combat ready. They were never given fighting orders by the political or military leadership who followed a strict military culture of waiting for orders.

-The Ukrainian army generals managed their forces centrally right down to platoon level, sometimes even from Kyiv. Instead of cleaning out the failed officers from the Armed Forces, as the public expected, (Ukrainian President) Poroshenko left the senior military intact.

-Corruption and inefficiency are at the heart of all this. The mess surrounding new weapons and equipment is legion. None of these problems are new. They are repeated regularly, but despite loud pronouncements from the Ministry of Defense and sometimes sackings of staff, nothing seems to change. The usual mantra is that all is OK, we have completed thousands of NATO standards, and reform is going well.

-The Ukrainian government and senior officials are masters at telling people what they want to hear. Additionally, many Ukrainian NGOs that brief foreign embassies live off the grants from those same diplomatic missions and so are also suspect in their offerings. The Ukrainian political mantra has been solidly, “We want to join NATO,” and “We are meeting NATO standards.” Neither of those declarations holds up to scrutiny.

-Furthermore, too many visiting senior officials and generals (from NATO and the United States) who do not know the stark reality, come and hand out medals and tell the Ukrainians what a great job they are doing without ever having seen anything real. These contacts were described by one interpreter as meetings of gratitude and praise for two hours with zero recommendations or criticism. These platitudes pander to the Ukrainians’ belief that they are doing well, ensuring that true reform again takes a back seat.

-The hardest thing for outside observers to accept is that much of what they read and hear is an illusion created by the government and defense staffs, designed to convince their own countrymen, NATO allies, and probably even Russia that reform is underway and that the (Ukrainian) forces are powerful and strong.

It is said that war is complex, chaotic, and unpredictable. The key to surviving any complex life or death situation is learning to adapt to the situation going on around us. Our brains learn to adapt. Adapt means to change, if we don’t change the way we think or behave then we didn’t learn a thing. Most of the problems identified by Glen Grant in 2021 are still relevant today, which means the Ukrainian military is not learning to adapt to its experiences. One of the primary reasons is because of what Grant calls out in the last three bullets above: what people in all country’s including Ukraine know about the war is an illusion created by government and defense officials, designed to convince their own countrymen, NATO allies, and probably even Russia that reform is underway and that the Ukrainian military is powerful and strong.

To better understand this problem and its significance as it relates to the Ukrainian military, I focused my research on military advice and feedback provided to the Ukrainians by “defense officials” from NATO countries, specifically, former General Officers who have served as advisors, contractors, or media influencers. Although there are plenty of examples from European NATO Generals, for brevity’s sake I limited my research to former US General Officers. A small sampling of their advice and feedback is summarized below.

Retired General David Petraeus in an interview with Radio Free Ukraine Summer 2022.

“Ukraine now has a better, larger, more capable military on its soil then does a country that is three times its size and population, and vastly larger in economic terms.” 

“President Zelensky has been absolutely brilliant… he communicates brilliantly, not just to the breadth and depth of the forces, and people in Ukraine, but the entire world every individual Parliament and Congress and Bundestag and everything. I mean, it’s accurate to say that he (Zelensky) has provided Churchillian leadership.”

(Ref Russia Military capabilities) “The Russians have an overinflated view of their own capabilities and a lack of appreciation of their longstanding traditional weaknesses, except that they have never been seen because they were up against forces like Chechens.” 

“The Russian kit Is old Cold War vintage, hand me downs again, wholly inadequate. They treat their soldiers like cannon fodder, and soldiers respond accordingly… Again, the culture in the Russian forces is absolutely abysmal as well, whereas the culture and the Ukrainian forces is vastly more professional.”

“Russian leader Vladimir Putin’ invasion of Ukraine has "made NATO great again."

Note: In July of 2022 the “Ukrainian World Congress” created a strategic advisory council for the defense of Ukraine. The council is comprised of retired generals David Petraeus (U.S.), Rick Hillier (Canada), Wesley Clark (U.S), and Dick Lodewijk Berlijn (Netherlands). The purpose of the council is to provide strategic expertise and operational assistance to Ukrainian forces. 

Retired U.S. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges. Multiple Media Outlets, Jan 2022-2025.  

(Ref. Ukraine’s 2022 counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast) “People around the world, not just in Ukraine, but in Europe, and the U.S., start thinking — wow, Ukraine can win. I’ve never doubted it. But now, I think, for more and more people, all of the sudden, the mythology of Russia’s inevitable victory is gone. This is a very important consequence.” 

“The counter-offensive in Kursk I thought was a brilliant move because it changed the narrative. It took the initiative away from the Russian side and forced the Russians now to have to deal with a strategic and operational challenge.”

“I look at Russia [and] they look weak. They’re weaker now than they were a year ago. Russia’s Defeat Is Closer Than You Think!”

“It’s easy for me to understand, but I deal with it all the time...defeating Russia first will improve Europe’s security and therefore American security for decades. And it would deter China. These are the reasons strategically.”

(Ref Peace Talks, The Ukrainian Review, 2025) “The whole set of conversations between the US and the Russian side does not seem connected to the reality of who Russia is. I Don’t See a Good Outcome for Ukraine if Russia Is Allowed to Retain Ukrainian Territory. European Forces In Ukraine Doesn't Need US Backstop.” 

Retired U.S. Army Gen. Jack Keane, various media outlets. 

(Ref Failed Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2023, Op-Ed, The Wall Street Journal) “America should stop the criticism of the Ukrainian military, because military officials critical of this offensive may well be out of their depth when it comes to knowledge of the kind of war Ukraine is fighting.”  

“Ukrainian forces are pioneering a new way of fighting modern war that should shape the way the US, NATO, and our other allies and partners prepare for future conflict.” 

“Ukraine already has all the elements that are necessary to beat Russia. They just need a strategy that we can help them put together with the right equipment to do that, and we can roll these Russians up. I'm absolutely convinced of it.” 

Retired US Army Brigadier General Mark Arnold in an interview with Radio Free Ukraine: (July 19, 2022)

“Ukraine can defeat Russia within a year.”  

(Ref counteroffensive or 2022) “The Ukrainian Army, all of the Ukrainian military performed brilliantly. Obviously, this exceeded all expectations of the Western countries. Your top military leadership has been excellent in its operational decisions.”  

Lesson Learned/ Recommendations:

Anyone can be misled or misguided by propaganda. However, when the reality of the situation going on around us continuously contradicts the propaganda narrative (once an incident, twice a coincidence, three times a pattern) it makes sense to dismiss the propaganda as lies in favor of the truth. Those that continue to deny and cover up the disastrous mistakes made on the battlefield (e.g. 69,000 Ukrainian KIA in Kursk), while ignoring the irrefutable facts around the EU/US led coup d'état that started the war in 2014, as well as the 14k ethnic Russian citizens who were killed in the seven years that followed, are deceiving themselves as well as those that consider them subject matter experts in the US and Europe. Critically, they also deny the Ukrainian people and military access to an accurate and actionable learning-feedback loop.  

-One of the key tenants of effectively spreading propaganda is to use individuals considered as subject matter experts to deliver it. Don’t allow yourself to be used as a propaganda promoter, and don’t allow yourself to be bamboozled by the propaganda that the supposed subject matter experts promote. Keep an open mind and understand what’s going on around you by listening to and learning from as many guys on the ground as possible, then make up your own mind. Remember that our most sacred freedom is freedom of choice to make sense of what’s going on around us and sensible choices about what to do next. 

-All former General Officers who publicly advise and opine on military matters should be required to disclose if they are being paid as influencers, as well as who is paying them, and how much.  

-When creating a new military, don’t make the same mistake that the French, German, British, and US have repeatedly made in the past, which is trying to create a military organization in a mirror image of their own. As the report by LTC (ret.) Glen Grant goes into detail on, the Ukraine military was designed and organized to comply with hundreds of random NATO standards. Complying with NATO standards thus became the litmus by which they gauged their readiness. Unfortunately, Ukraine didn’t need a military that complies with NATO standards, they needed a military that could operate and defend their country on the terrain and waterways that surround them. They also needed honest feedback on their efforts to accomplish it.  

-If you’re looking to hire advisors to help you build something—in the Ukrainians case a Military---you must find advisors that understand the nuts and bolts of how it works. If you want what you build to accomplish its purpose, your advisors must also understand how to operate it effectively. As their comments above provide empirical proof of, General Officers rarely understand the nuts and bolts of how a military works, nor how to operate it at the ground level. To get the biggest bang for your military advisor buck, hire retired Mater Sergeant’s, Sergeant Majors, and mid-level officers who have real-world combat experience, and who understand the nuts and bolts of military units and how to operate them. 

Coming Soon: Part II: The NATO Model of Command and Control Didn’t Work in Iraq and Afghanistan, and It Doesn’t Work in Ukraine.