Commander Salamander Substack

This time of the year you have to make a decision: do I discuss the Normandy Invasion or the Battle of Midway?

Well, you know where we are going today, but I want to honor those who fought the battle from a slightly different angle.

You still hear statements about the battle that on the American side, “there were no successful torpedo attacks” … that isn’t true. You also hear statements that the torpedo attacks were a waste … and that isn’t true.

Generally speaking, the well-read and informed know that the carrier-based dive bombers would not have had the success they enjoyed without the distraction and sacrifice provided by the torpedo bombers. That is an indirect effect.

A smaller cohort is aware of the significant contributions of the USN, USMC, and USAAC aircraft based out of Midway. Inside that, a smaller group understand how Admiral Nagumo’s dilemma was only made worse by the B-26 attacks which came very close and caused him to fixate on the land based threat instead of the carrier threat. Another indirect effect.

Of course, all of the sacrifice of the torpedo carrying aircraft is made worse by the knowledge we have now, which they were still unaware of, about the full extent of the problem with the MK-13 torpedo they carried.

But carry it they did.

Fullbore.

So today, let’s focus on low, slow, and determined the battle. What was the cost to drive home that attack for those who approached the Imperial Japanese Navy at 100 or 200 feet above the water, maybe 150 knots so your early-war torpedo would run true, in the face of a hellscape of steel, lead, and shell. We’re going to include not just the carrier aircraft, but those on Midway as well.

The battle was a close-run thing. Yes, we sank their carriers, but when all was said and done, the American airwings were almost combat ineffective. Same for the often overlooked aircraft based out of Midway.

Getting an exact number of aircraft that were lost based out of the Midway that were lost during the battle are are hard to come by. Reports vary by a bit, but here is what I think is close.

• F2A Buffalo (Fighter): ~13
• F4F Wildcat (Fighter): ~4
• SB2U Vindicator (Dive Bomber): ~4
• SBD Dauntless (Dive Bomber): ~4
• B-26 Marauder (Medium Bomber): 2
• B-17 Flying Fortress (Heavy Bomber): 0
• TBF Avenger (Torpedo Bomber): 5
• PBY Catalina (Flying Boat): ~2–3
• Total Midway-Based Losses: ~34–35 aircraft

The losses in carrier-based aircraft also differ from one source to another, but this is close for our purposes.

• F4F Wildcat (Fighter): ~11
• SBD Dauntless (Dive Bomber): ~47
• TBD Devastator (Torpedo Bomber): ~35
• Total Carrier-Based Losses: ~94 aircraft

That gives us 129 aircraft lost to the Japanese. The National WWII Museum puts the number at 144. The Midway Memorial Foundation at 145. Other sources, 150.

As I tried to get losses by type, the above is all I could come up with. That’s OK, we’ll call it the conservative number.

As mentioned earlier, let’s limit the scope of the discussion and focus on the aircraft that flew toward the Japanese fleet with torpedoes: B-26 Marauder, PBY Catalina, Devastator, and Avenger.

Again, numbers vary by source, so if your numbers are 2-3 close to mine, give me a little grace here if you don’t mind.

At sea, Enterprise carried 14 Devastators, Hornet 15, Yorktown 13. That gives you 42 total.

On Midway, there were 6 Avengers, 4 B-26, and 30 PBY.

Over all, at sea and ashore, the U.S.A. sent the following torpedo aircraft:

• Devastator: 42 faced the enemy, 35 were lost. 83% loss rate.
• Avenger: 6 faced the enemy, 5 were lost. 83% loss rate.
• B-26 Marauder: 4 faced the enemy. 2 were lost. 50% loss rate.
• PBY: 4 of the 30 stationed there were sent on a night attack mission with torpedoes (the rest were used for patrol). 2 were lost. 50% loss rate.
• Combined loss rate for aircraft attempting a torpedo attack on the Japanese fleet at Midway, 79%.

Though the PBY could carry 2 MK-13, a few sources mention that for this mission (probably due to range consideration) they carried only 1.

So, we can assume that 56 torpedoes were sent by aircraft against the Japanese fleet. We don’t know how many aircraft were able to actually launch them. What we do know is that one of them found its mark during a night attack.

A PBY Catalina based out of Midway.

The U.S. Navy pilots of the four Consolidated PBY-5A Catalinas of Patrol Squadron 24 (VP-24) and VP-51 that flew the torpedo attack mission against the Japanese fleet's Midway Occupation Force during the night of 3-4 June 1942.
Those present are (left to right): Lieutentant (Junior Grade) Douglas C. Davis, of VP-24; Ensign Allan Rothenberg, of VP-51; Lieutenant William L. Richards, Executive Officer of Patrol Squadron 44 (VP-44), who flew in a VP-24 aircraft on this mission; and Ensign Gaylord D. Propst, of VP-24.

Richards hit the Japanese oil tanker Akebono Maru, flying PBY "24-P-12". This was the only successful air-launched torpedo attack by the U.S. during the entire Battle of Midway.

Akebono Maru did not sink. Indeed, she survived the war only to sink finally in 1957 on the way to the breakers. In 2011, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. delivered the new Akebono Maru, this time a LNG carrier, to Shinwa Chemical Tanker Co., Ltd., but I digress.

Interesting note here about the PBY losses—and it drives me nuts we have such sketchy records. While most accounts of the Battle of Midway mention that two PBY were lost during the battle, of those two losses, some accounts say one of the four PBY that made the night attack were shot down. Some way two of the four were shot down. Some imply the one or two were lost while conducting reconnaissance and don’t even mention the four-plane night attack. Reports are all over the map and the books I have in my library don’t help with one answer.

However, the picture above shows four pilots. Two are Ensign, one is a LTjg, and a LT (the XO of the squadron). PBY have two pilots. (BTW, they should have had the entire crew in the picture, not just the pilots. Net one below.) So is that the pilot and co-pilot of the two surviving PBY? I don’t think you would have two of four PBY at this stage of the war having the senior pilot being an Ensign. Either it did and all four made it back, or the accounts that state two of the four were lost in the night attack are valid. Again, amazing how sparse the details are. For this and other information on this post, if you have a better, more accurate source, please put it in comments and I will adjust as needed.

While I’m here, another thing came to mind—how many Navy, USAAC, and USMC airmen who were shot down managed to survive and get rescued?

Records are, again, spotty even on how many airmen were shot down and needed rescue. Some say 150-200. I think that number is greater and I can get closer.

Devastators and Avengers have three crewmen. 40 lost aircraft put 120 men in the drink.

B-26 Marauders had 7 crewmen. Two lost, 14 men in the drink.

PBY Catalina had 8 crewmen. Two lost, 16 men in the drink.

Just with torpedo carrying aircraft, we have 150 men in the water.

44 aircraft and 150 crew … all so one successful hit with a torpedo.

Stop for a second. Do that math. Put it in a modern context.

Going beyond the torpedo carrying aircraft, the Dauntless and Vindicator diver bombers were dual crew, so the 55 that were lost would put 110 in the drink.

The Buffalo and Wildcat fighters are single seat, so their 28 losses put another 28 in the drink.

That gets me to 288 airmen needing rescue.

The best accounts I can find state that only 20-40 airmen were pulled out of the water. That gives you a survival rate of 10-20% or so. Not everyone who survived being shot down were rescued. That we do know. They floated on the great, vast Pacific waiting for someone to see their little yellow speck in an expanse of blue. Ship, submarine, or more likely, a PBY.

A final note: in the next Great Pacific War, our few-and-huge SSN will not be doing picket duty for downed airmen who strained to get their wounded birds as far east as possible from the Asian landmass and their countrymen before punching out or ditching. We have very few surface ships, and their VLS tubes cannot be spared from guarding their CVN. We no longer have battleships and cruisers that provided acres of deckspace for air defense so CSG can spare a DDG and their helo dets or two burning fuel looking for downed airmen. We have no more flying boats for the absolute worst reasons.

You cannot talk your way to avoid the ravages of weather, wave, and thirst. You need rescue. What a horrible way, and reason, to die.

In the next Great Pacific War, we are setting ourselves up to have an even worse rescue rate. At-sea rescue of downed airmen will be seen as a miracle, even more than it once was. That is not an accident of fate, no, it isn’t that simple. A slow death from exposure and thirst with no hope will be the direct byproduct of decisions made in full conscious knowledge that future airmen are being condemned to an unnecessary death.