...the spider has a nasty bark...
The above picture from 2012 of Norfolk is what I want you to think about.
We talked about the superbly executed Ukrainian attack on Russian bomber bases for most of yesterday’s Midrats, and what keeps coming to mind for me is not the details of that attack, but the stark warning it is giving us.
The threat of drone strikes isn’t a new warning, but in my mind it intersect almost perfectly with the self-inflicted vulnerability of the US Navy’s fleet—its concentration.
The growing utility of attack drones isn’t an insight that is unique to the Russo-Ukrainian War. The topic has come up here and on Midrats for almost two decades. We’re not alone. Heck, broad thinking people like our friend Matt Hipple was pondering it over at CIMSEC thirteen years ago a few months before the picture at the top of the post was made.
I’ll tie in the picture a bit, but let’s take a moment to give the Ukrainians credit where credit is due. They executed precision strikes against the RUS bomber fleet across the entire two-thirds of the Euro-Asian landmass.
We will find out more details, a dozen or 40+ high-demand/low-density strategic bombers were taken off the battle line. RUS is not building any more of them. As missile carriers, they have been a cornerstone of the city terrors for most of the last four years. You would be hard-pressed to find a more honorable, or legitimate target.
Streiff over at Red State has a good summary with what we think we know as of Sunday afternoon:
The airbases are the home to Russia's fleet of Tu-22, Tu-95M, and Tu-160 nuclear-capable strategic bombers as well as AS-50 battle management aircraft. They were located from the Siberian Far East to the Arctic Circle. The furthest target, Belaya Airbase in Irkutsk, is over 2700 miles from Ukraine.
Reports indicate that at least 41 aircraft were hit. The unofficial tally indicates 24 Tu-22, 8 Tu-95MS, and 5 Tu-16 were hit. MiG-31 fighters and Il-76 transports were also hit. To put this in context, open-source data says Russia's bomber inventory is about 58 Tu-22, 47 Tu-95MS, and 15 Tu-160. These planes are the ones used to launch most of the missiles fired at Ukrainian cities.
By any standard, this was a devastating attack. Nearly half of the Tu-22, a quarter of the Tu-95MS, and a third of the Tu-160 fleet, representing just over 30 percent of Russia's strategic bomber force, were damaged or destroyed in one attack. When you consider the operational readiness rate, Russia probably has less than 50 aircraft capable of flying...on the bright side, they have plenty of aircraft to cannibalize for parts. The Tu-22 and Tu-95MS production lines are closed, and the Tu-160 production is one, yes, one per year. For all intents and purposes, this represents a permanent decrease in the size of the Russian strategic bomber fleet.
Before we discuss what the USA needs to take away, let’s look at the top-4 primary and second-order effects this will have on the Russian Federation.
First Order Effects
- Fewer raiding assets to use against UKR.
- The weakest leg of their nuclear triad (bombers are dual use) is even weaker.
- PSYOP defeat as RUS now know even their most valuable weapons, stationed deep into RUS rear, are vulnerable.
- Paranoia elevated into an already paranoid national psyche under duress of year four of a grinding war.
Second Order Effects
- Inefficiencies in both civilian logistics and manpower are the natural response to every tractor-trailer being a weapons delivery vehicle at range…and the need to defend important bases as a result, sinks into an already stressed nation. UKR
- Loss of face. RUS launched a war of choice against nation 1/4th its size and much weaker than it from any measure, and four years on, still has only made marginal progress. Now that nation proved it can operate with impunity anywhere inside RUS. The “R” in BRICS is not impressing its friends.
- It shouldn’t, but this is going to get the nuclear autists the jitters. All theory, but yes, UKR took out one-third or more of the fully mission capable nuclear capable bombers that form one leg—but as mentioned above the weakest leg—of RUS’s nuclear deterrence. Those who work in the theory-dominated nuclear world will have all their gauges twitching, yes, but in the end analysis, it won’t matter.
- UKR morale just got a big boost. Wars of attrition usually last until one side or the other loses either the material ability or the will to fight. At least from the “will” line of operation, that decisive point just shifted to the right.
Simply a superb operation. How do you defend against weapons like this disguised in a trailer’s false roof?
Now, let’s loop back to the picture at the top of the post. It ties in real well with Tom Shugart’s post on X back last August.
That is the big takeaway that the USA needs to take away from this. It should have
The unending battle between the green eye-shade wearing priests of the Cult of Efficiency are unsleeping and relentless. They will not be the ones everyone will be looking to at D+0 for combat effectiveness. Those who want an emphasis on combat effectiveness must start winning arguments.
Ponder the above while watching this video. Then we’ll “Americanize” the point.
Americans should not laugh too hard at the Russians.
We have B-52 are at two bases, Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, and Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana.
Our B-1 (conventional only) are at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas and Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota.
With less than 20 fully mission capable B-2 (readiness and maintenance aside) at just one base, Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri.
That’s five bases, the same number of Russian bases UKR just hit.
Does the below look familiar?
It raises the question:
This has been a known threat for a long time. We have let in tens of millions of foreign nationals come into our nation without vetting. Most are military aged men. Tens to hundreds of thousands are Chinese, Iranian, and Russian nationals.
Joshua Steinman and others have a long-running questions of how many sabotage cells do we already have in place in the USA?
It is a non-zero number.
If they are here and we simply cannot in our open society find them all even if we wanted, then there is only one response—make their mission more difficult.
We have to harden our bases, give them more 24/7/365 defense capability against air threats, and we should return to a concept understood well by our ancestors: strategic homeporting.
Well inside living memory, this requirement came to the front. A big push took place in the Reagan Administration, but as it started to get legs, the Cold War ended followed by the Decade of the Lotus Eaters where we BRAC’d ourselves into strategic risk.
The green eye-shade priests of the Temple of the Spreadsheet won the argument, so we find ourselves here.
The last strong push by anyone meaningful (I do not include myself or other 3rd tier commenters who have warned of this for decades) was circa 2010/11 when Admiral John Harvey, USN (Ret.) stepped into the open to call for a return to strategic homeporting. It started to get footing for while. Plans were made to put nuclear carriers in Mayport even, but the accountants of doom smothered it in a POM cycle
That was it. I could do 2,000 words on the whole host of beneficial effects of spreading the fleet around, but not today.
How concentrated is our Navy? Somewhere between 40-50% of US Navy ships are located in just two locations, Norfolk and San Diego. Another ~20% are at various bases in Washington State. The rest of mostly based out of Pearl Harbor, Mayport, Japan, Spain, New London, and Kings Bay.
Don’t even get me started about the “Master Air Bases” where we have stupidly concentrated—for efficiency—most of our combat aircraft at just a few bases.
You don’t have to be a UKR special operations planner to figure this out. If anything, naval bases offer even more options to attack.
Gate guards only do so much. Having armed Sailors on the quarterdeck is something for an old school threat. Keep those.
However, what do we have in place to protect our nation from strategic risk of attack like the Russians just had?
Where would you vote?
As a side note: it would do the nation good to have 6 DDG based in Newport, RI and to reopen NAS Brunswick, ME. More military needs to be back in New England. Charleston, SC is superb. The Gulf Coast is wonderful. The San Francisco Bay is tanned, rested, and ready.
Lower strategic risk, better recruiting opportunities, more options for service members, more members of Congress with skin in the game. Everyone wins.
The mistakes of the past can be corrected.
ABSOLUTELY CORRECT,sir.